

**HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON U.S.
PACIFIC COMMAND IN REVIEW OF THE DE-
FENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FIS-
CAL YEAR 2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM**

TUESDAY, APRIL 9, 2013

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room SDG-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson, Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain, Wicker, Ayotte, and Graham.

Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan, professional staff member; Jonathan S. Epstein, counsel; Ozge Gozelsu, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and Russell L. Shaffer, counsel.

Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, Minority Staff Director; Thomas W. Goffus, professional staff member; and Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Mariah K. McNamara, John L. Principato, and Bradley S. Watson.

Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Jeff Fatora, assistant to Senator Nelson; David LaPorte, assistant to Senator Manchin; Marta McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Hirono; Karen Courington, assistant to Senator Kaine; Steve Smith, assistant to Senator King; Christian Brose and Brian Rogers, assistants to Senator McCain; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; and Craig Abele, assistant to Senator Graham.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. We hope our speakers work here. The microphone I don't think is working. We're going to start without the mike. Okay, I've got to get closer.

We're receiving testimony today on the posture of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and on behalf of the committee first let me welcome Admiral Samuel Locklear, the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command. Admiral, the committee appreciates your long years of faithful service and the many sacrifices that you and your family have made for our Nation, and we would also greatly appreciate it if you would pass along to the men and women with whom you work our admiration for their service as well. We know this is a particularly busy time for you, Admiral, and for your staff. We appreciate your joining us today.

General Thurman, the Commander of U.S. Forces-Korea, was originally scheduled to testify today as well, but the decision was made to keep him on the Korean Peninsula at this time and we understand and appreciate the reasons for that decision. We wish General Thurman well in his ongoing activities.

Today's hearing is a particularly timely one because of the events on the Korean Peninsula, which have intensified as the North Korean regime, which is a longstanding international pariah, has elevated its reckless rhetoric and its provocative behavior. Any guarded optimism about North Korea that may have accompanied the December 2011 death of long-time dictator Kim Jong Il has faded as the new regime has adopted many of the same destructive policies as its predecessors, stubbornly pursuing its nuclear weapons and its ballistic missile programs with callous disregard for the wellbeing of its own people and the region.

Earlier this month the North Korean regime announced its intention to restart plutonium production at Yongbyon. In February it tested a nuclear device that appears to have a yield greater than that shown in previous North Korean tests. In December of last year, the regime put a satellite in orbit using technologies associated with long-range ballistic missiles. And last April it displayed a road-mobile missile launcher which may or may not be operational.

The North Korean regime's rhetorical threats appear to exceed its capabilities and its use of what capabilities it has against the United States or our allies seems highly unlikely and would be completely contrary to the regime's primary goal of survival. Nonetheless, its words and actions are not without consequences. Even China, despite its longstanding relationship with North Korea, has joined in United Nations condemnation of the North Korean regime's dangerous behavior and has supported new sanctions, including tighter financial restrictions and bans on luxury goods.

A few weeks ago, Secretary Hagel announced a plan to enhance our ground-based interceptor capability in Alaska, and just last week the Department announced the deployment of a THAD ballistic missile defense system to Guam as a further precautionary measure.

The administration has responded to North Korea's bluster, not with hot rhetoric of our own, but with firm and confident resolve with our partners and countries in the region who want stability and calm, always looking forward to the time when the oppressive North Korea regime will come to an end.

I am puzzled by the delay of the long-scheduled ICBM operational test following the North Korean rhetorical threats. Why

was this delayed? Why was our test delayed? I would appreciate knowing, Admiral, if you agree with the decision which was made to delay that test.

The Republic of Korea remains one of the United States' most steadfast and reliable allies and we are working in close coordination to address the North Korean challenge. We look forward to hearing Admiral Locklear's views on recent developments on the Korean Peninsula and additional steps that can be taken.

We face many other challenges and opportunities in the Asia-Pacific region as well. China's continued rise in regional and global influence, coupled with its military modernization and growth, has drawn justifiable attention from the Department of Defense. China's pursuit of capabilities that extend the reach of its military raises concerns about Chinese intentions, particularly in the context of that country's increasing willingness to assert its controversial claims of sovereignty in areas of the South China Sea and the East China Sea.

In addition, China's lack of regard for the intellectual property rights of the United States and other nations remains a huge problem for the global community. China remains the leading source of counterfeit parts both in military systems and in the commercial sector. In addition, China appears to have engaged in a massive campaign to steal technology and other vital business information from American industry and our government. China's apparent willingness to exploit cyber space to conduct corporate espionage and to steal trade and proprietary information from U.S. companies should drive our government and our businesses to come together to advance our own cyber security.

There are a number of other PACOM missions that warrant our attention as well, such as enduring—excuse me—such as ensuring freedom of navigation and protecting the free flow of commerce through critical sea lanes of communication, strengthening alliances, and building on partnerships, providing expertise and support to countries committed to fighting transnational violent extremism, working to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and preparing for and assisting with humanitarian and disaster relief efforts.

To better meet these challenges, the administration continues to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific. The Defense Department has been working through substantial realignments of U.S. military forces in countries like South Korea and Japan and is also engaged in initiatives to position forces further to the south in countries such as Australia, Singapore, and possibly the Philippines. As we rebalance and realign our presence in the Asia-Pacific area, it is important that we get it right in terms of strategy, but also in terms of resourcing and sustainability.

This committee will continue to exercise its oversight responsibilities, to ensure that our forward presence in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere in the world is affordable, sustainable, and operationally supportable. In this regard, the committee has recently approved the report of its inquiry into U.S. costs and allied contributions associated with U.S. military presence overseas and we anticipate releasing this report in the next few days.

With respect to the planned realignment of U.S. Marines currently on Okinawa, Senator McCain, former Senator Webb, and I advocated changes for the 2006 U.S.-Japan realignment road map plan to better support U.S. strategic goals in the region while also accounting for the fiscal, political, and diplomatic realities associated with long-term sustainability. The April 2012 joint U.S.-Japan announcement of changes to the 2006 plan reflected an appreciation by both governments of the need to make adjustments in order to support the goal of achieving a more viable and sustainable U.S. Marine presence in Japan, on Guam, and elsewhere in the region.

The Department of Defense is currently working to develop the details of this new plan and the final construction schedule and total costs are not yet known. After we receive that plan, we will be in a position to judge it. But until that plan is forthcoming, the committee has deferred action on associated requirements until previously adopted conditions are met. So while I support the concept of restationing Marines from Okinawa to Guam, it must be done in a fiscally and operationally sound manner.

Of course, we must consider all these challenges and initiatives in the Asia-Pacific against the backdrop of the budget constraints of sequestration. And, Admiral, we'd be interested in your assessment as to the effects of sequestration on your ability to meet mission requirements in your area of responsibility.

Again, we very much appreciate all the work that you do for this Nation. We appreciate your joining us this morning. We look forward to your testimony.

Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Locklear, you're on your own today, but I think that General Thurman made the right decision staying where he is. So I'm sure you can handle all of this today.

North Korea's recent actions highlight the historic disparity between the Obama administration's triumphant declaration that the tide of the war is receding and the reality. Old threats are being replaced by new, more dangerous ones, just like Kim Jong Il was replaced by Kim Jong Un. North Korea's new leader, Kim Jong Un, brutally represses his people and is engaged in provocative statements, military exercises, and nuclear tests that have pushed the region onto the brink of conflict. I just got back from there and I got the clear impression that he was doing that intentionally just to intimidate and to provoke people.

Both General Thurman and Admiral Locklear are implementing prudent steps that include continuing to train our South Korean partners in exercises like Full Eagle, practicing strike missions with the F-22, the B-2, and the B-52 aircraft, moving Aegis cruisers closer to the Korean Peninsula, and installing the THAD capability in Guam. Our increased military capabilities in the region are designed to deter North Korea aggression. Should deterrence fail, they also stand ready to punish aggression, to protect vital United States interests.

Though I'm encouraged by the President's reversal of his previous decision by acquiring the 14 additional ground-based inter-

ceptors, which is right after he got rid of the 14 GBI's, and I think the decision to reverse that first decision was the right one. I think that doesn't address the problem, though, that we would have, which is not really in your area, but the third site that we've been talking about, the regretful thing that we did in getting rid of the ground-based interceptor capability in Poland four years ago.

China's growing defensive capabilities and aggression demand that we understand our capability to defend Taiwan and how PACOM intends to tailor—I took all of the stuff I had on China out of my opening statement because I agree with the statement that the chairman made and I think he covered it very well. We've got to have a clear long-term strategy that details adjustments to our force posture, including a plan for Marine presence in Okinawa, Guam, Hawaii, and Australia. It's been over a year since the administration announced the rebalance to Asia and I look to Admiral Locklear as the commander on the ground to provide the committee with a detailed description of what the rebalance means in military terms.

I also look forward to his frank assessment as to how the ongoing budget crisis will impact his plans and operations in the Pacific. I have some questions about that and I'm sure that you'll give us very straightforward answers.

I'm deeply concerned about the growing divide between what we expect our military to accomplish and the resources that we're providing them. I've often said, Admiral, that you do a great job with the hand you're being dealt; we need to deal you a better hand.

I can't recall a time in my life when the world has been more dangerous and, while the President naively sees the tide of war receding, I see the continued need for a strong, able, and well resourced force that remains engaged in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. This insistence by this President to drastically slash the defense budget puts the future of such a force at risk. The Obama Administration's plan to have the Defense Department, which makes up only 18 percent of the budget, be accountable for 50 percent of the reduction is not responsible. Shortsighted cuts to defense capabilities will result in a weakened U.S. military and would embolden adversaries like North Korea.

The reckless course of action pursued by the regime in Pyongyang underscores the importance of our forward military posture in the Asia-Pacific. Our presence helps to shape events and underpin stability, in this case very concretely through deterrence. But should deterrence fail, make no mistake, our military forces stand by, ready to defend the Nation.

Thank you very much, Admiral, and I look forward to your testimony.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Admiral.

**STATEMENT OF ADM. SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR III, USN,
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND**

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and provide you with my

perspectives on the posture of the U.S. Pacific Command. I request that my written testimony be included in the record.

Chairman LEVIN. It will be.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. For the past 13 months or so, I've had the great honor to lead the 328,000 service members and about 38,000 civilian employees and their families in the PACOM area. Our area of responsibility is diverse and complex. It encompasses about 52 percent of the world's surface and half the world's, over half the world's population. It's culturally, socially, economically, and geopolitically diverse. The nations of what I refer to as the Indo-Asia Pacific, because that's the framework I see it in, include 5 of our Nation's 7 treaty allies, 3 of the largest and 7 of the 10 smallest economies, the most populated nations in the world, including the largest Muslim-majority nation, the largest democracy in the world, and of course the world's smallest republic as well.

The Indo-Asia Pacific is the engine that drives the global economy. The open and accessible sea lanes throughout the Indo-Asia Pacific annually enjoy about \$8 trillion in bilateral trade, with one-third of the world's bulk cargo and two-thirds of the world's oil shipments sailing to and from the nine of the world's ten largest economic ports which are in the Asia-Pacific.

So by any meaningful measure, the Indo-Asia Pacific is also the world's most militarized region, with 7 of the 10 largest standing militaries, the world's largest and most sophisticated navies, 5 of the world's declared nuclear-armed nations. So when taken altogether, these aspects, they present a region with a unique strategic complexity and a wide, diverse group of challenges that can significantly stress the security environment.

Now, effectively engaging in the Indo-Asia Pacific requires a committed and sustained effort, and PACOM as a military component of this commitment is clearly focused in our efforts to deter aggression, to assure our allies and our partners, and to prevent conflict should our National interests be threatened.

While the Indo-Asia Pacific is relatively peaceful over time, I'm concerned by a number of security challenges similar to those that you've outlined, Mr. Chairman, that have the possibility to impact the stability of today's security environment. I'm sure we'll talk later about the Korean Peninsula, but it appears it will persist and an impetuous young leader continues to focus on provocation rather than on his own people.

The rise of China and India as global economic powers and their emergence as regional military powers will continue, and with China specifically we will focus our efforts on building relationships with them and doing all we can to assist them as they emerge into a security environment as hopefully productive contributors to the global peace and prosperity.

We expect that the growing populations of the world will continue to be challenged by inevitable earthquakes and tsunamis and typhoons and flooding, as well as continued transnational threats like pandemics, pirates, terrorists, criminal organizations, human trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

We will also no doubt see historic and emerging border and territorial disputes continue as the competition for water, food, and energy grow, and we expect that access and freedom of action in the

shared domains of sea, air, space, and cyber will become increasingly challenged.

Finally, there's no single organization, mechanism, in the Indo-Asia Pacific to manage the relationships when it's needed or to provide a framework for conflict resolution. So we have to rely on our allies and our growing partner relationships, including those that we're growing with multilateral organizations like ASEAN to ensure that we can maintain the peace.

The U.S. joint force has been heavily tasked in other AOR's over the past decade and as a consequence in my AOR, in the U.S. PACOM, in many key areas we have been resource-challenged and have assumed additional risk. Our rebalance to the Pacific strategy has given us a new opportunity to begin to solve these challenges and to reemphasize to our allies and our partners that we are committed to the Pacific, that we are a committed Pacific nation. It also reflects the recognition that the future prosperity will be defined largely by events and developments in the Indo-Asia Pacific.

Over the past year the rebalance has helped focus our planning and our resourcing decisions as we work closer with our allies and partners to ensure a security environment favorable to U.S. interests. However, the impacts of sequestration have created budget uncertainties, limited our flexibility to manage risk, and have the potential to undermine our long-term strategic rebalance momentum.

Nonetheless, PACOM will work with the services to preserve to the extent possible our essential homeland defense and crisis response capabilities, capabilities resident in our forward-deployed forces.

The Pacific Ocean does not separate the U.S. from Asia; it connects us. We are connected by our economies, our cultures, our shared interests, and our security challenges. We've been resource-challenged and we've been accepting risk in the Indo-Asia Pacific region for some time. But our rebalance strategy is in place and we're making good progress.

Let me assure you that PACOM will continue to demonstrate to our allies, our partners, and others the U.S.'s resolve and commitment to peace and security in this important part of the world.

On behalf of our superb military and civilian members and their families, all of whom sacrifice every day to ensure that our country is well defended, I'd like to thank each member of this committee for your support. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Locklear follows:]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Admiral.

We're going to try to use the technology we've been provided with here today. Senator Inhofe said the other day: How come we don't use timers like every other committee? And my answer was: I don't have the vaguest idea why we don't use timers. So we're going to find out whether they actually have an impact on us. Instead of a card being handed in front of us, now you've got to keep your eyes on the timer. So let's see if it works.

We're going to start with 8 minutes.

Senator MCCAIN. A quantum leap.

Chairman LEVIN. A quantum leap, right. A small step for the committee, major step for mankind.

So, Admiral, let me start. Over the weekend the Department announced that they were delaying a routine reliability test of a Minuteman III ICBM that would have been from Vandenberg Air Force Base to an impact site in the Marshall Islands 4,300 miles away. The test was apparently delayed so it would not be misconstrued by North Korea.

Now, I know you're not in the chain of command here, but basically do you agree with that decision and do you know what the basis for it was?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I do agree with the decision. I assume that the basis of the decision was to look at the strategic communications, at all the events surrounding this particular tenuous time with North Korea, and the impacts of the totality of those. So it is my sense that through this period of the last few weeks that we have demonstrated to the people of the region, we've demonstrated hopefully to the leadership of North Korea, we've demonstrated to our own population back here, our ability and our willingness to defend our Nation, to defend our people, to defend our allies, and defend our forward-deployed forces.

So I did agree with the decision.

Chairman LEVIN. What are some of the things that we've done in response to the bellicose rhetoric of North Korea?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, we have an exercise that we have—we do a series of exercises each year with all of our allies. In particular with North Korea, about this time of year each we do an exercise called Key Resolve.

Chairman LEVIN. With South Korea?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. With South Korea, we do Key Resolve and Full Eagle. Those exercises are to build our alliance capabilities together, our defensive capabilities together. Many of the activities that you've seen play out over the last month are a result of an exercise that we would do annually anyway.

So normally at this time of year also you will see in North Korea that they will go into their winter training cycle and they will conclude that winter training cycle about the time that Full Eagle finishes. So we have those two events happening at the same time.

So when you lay on top of that the bellicose rhetoric that has come out of North Korea and the follow-up from the nuclear test and now the poor decisions that it appears that he's making, each of these events that were rolled out at Full Eagle start to take on a more significant strategic context. But they all I think demonstrate the strength of the alliance, demonstrate the defensive capabilities we build in the alliance, and demonstrate the deterrence capability of the forces that we bring together.

In addition, we pursued a long-range B-2 demonstration as part of Full Eagle that came from the United States here. It was a good opportunity for my forces in PACOM to coordinate with STRATCOM and for us to be able to demonstrate that capability. I believe the fact that it was visibly demonstrated was done at the right time to indicate the capabilities that the United States has to ensure the defense of our allies and of our homeland.

Chairman LEVIN. I believe also we moved a missile defense system; is that correct?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. From Guam, I believe.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes, sir, we did. At my request, I asked the joint force to be able to produce for the defense of Guam the THAD asset and that request was supported and we're doing that to ensure that we can adequately defend our U.S. territories as well.

Chairman LEVIN. I understand that President Obama talked to Chinese President Xi recently regarding the actions that we have taken following this North Korean spate of rhetoric. Have you had any conversations with your military counterparts in China in the last couple of weeks?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I have not.

Chairman LEVIN. There's a—a widespread attack by North Korea, conventional or otherwise, seems highly unlikely, but nonetheless there is a prospect, based on history, for a limited military action of some type from North Korea. If there were such an event, that would, I presume, draw a military response from South Korea.

The United States and South Korea have reportedly finalized something called a Combined Counter-Provocation Plan in an effort to get in place the terms and type of any such response to a limited military action from North Korea. Can you describe for us in general terms what the parts of that agreement are and are you satisfied that the plan that we have entered into with South Korea strikes the right balance between enabling South Korea to respond and to defend itself, at the same time ensuring that the United States is involved in any decisions that might widen a military action to include U.S. forces?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes, sir. You know we've been planning with our ally, joint planning together for many, many years. We have plans that we've worked together and we continually revise them. This particular plan that has been talked about is basically what I would call a branch from our normal day to day planning we have there to take a look at how things have changed. This is a recognition of a better understanding of the cycle of provocation that we see from not only this leader, but his father as well, and how best to deal with it.

I won't go into the details of the plan here because I don't think that's appropriate. But I do think that it is a good planning effort. I think that it has provided us and General Thurman and his counterparts there the opportunity to ensure that the right command and control and the right coordination is in place, to ensure that as we were to approach future provocations that we do so in a predictable way that allows us to be able to manage those provocations without, hopefully without the unnecessary escalation that none of us want.

So I am supportive of the plan, I think it's a good one, and we will continue to revise it as time goes on.

Chairman LEVIN. Are you satisfied that we would be ready if there were such a limited military action from North Korea?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I am satisfied that we're ready today, yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Can you give us briefly the impact of sequestration on the Pacific Command?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, there's no doubt that sequestration is having an impact on near-term operational readiness. By nature of the way that sequestration is put into the budget, particularly in this year, in the execution year of 2013, there's only so many places that we can pay that size of a bill, and most of the places that the Services have to go to are in readiness and operational accounts.

So I would say that for us to be able to deal with that what we have done, what the services have done, is that we've prioritized our assets globally as well as inside the Asia-Pacific to be able to ensure that our most pressing problems are properly addressed with the right force levels and the right levels of readiness. So today I think we have managed that inside the PACOM AOR.

Now, where I have concerns is in that—that's just for today, but what happens in the near—in the midterm, as our overall readiness of our force starts to decline because of the impacts of the way that sequestration has been implemented. So you're seeing things like we're cancelling large-scale exercises that we've done to ensure the readiness, future readiness of our force, because we can't—don't have the flying hours, nor the transportation or the fuel supplies to do that or the fuel money to do that. So we're having to prioritize those things towards those things in PACOM theater which are most pressing, and today that most pressing situation is what's happening on the peninsula in Korea.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, as you and I have talked about before, I'd like to get clarification on one statement that was I think misrepresented. It was in the Boston Globe, reported that you indicated—and I'm quoting now from the Boston Globe—"The biggest long-term security threat in the Pacific region is climate change."

Now, I'd like to have you clarify what you meant by that because I want to follow up with a couple of things here.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Thanks for asking that question. I'm happy to have the opportunity to clarify.

Senator INHOFE. I say that because a lot of the people who are trying to use that and use your statement are the very people who think we're spending too much money on defense and that that money should be spent in other areas. Some of the environmentalists extremists don't really believe we need to have that strong of a military, as strong as we have right now, in spite of the hit that we've taken militarily.

But go ahead.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. As you might expect, I give 100 or so interviews over the last year. During those interviews, I can assure the committee that I always start by talking about the most pressing military threats that we have—North Korea, the rise of powers in the region, transnational threats, all the things that Chairman Levin laid out in his opening remarks quite well.

In this particular case, I did the same. Then we started to talk about the long term, the long long term and what are the implications of it. I would—I'd clarify my perspective this way. In the

Indo-Asia Pacific region, as we go from about—projections are we're going to go from about 7 billion people in the world to about 9 or 10 by the century, and about 70 percent of them are going to live in this part of the world.

About 80 percent of them today live within about 200 miles of the coast, and that trend is increasing as people move towards the economic centers which are near the ports and facilities that support globalization. So we're seeing that trend of people moving into littoral areas.

We are also seeing—if you go to USAID and you ask the numbers for my PACOM AOR how many people died due to natural disasters from 2008 to 2012, it was about 280,000 people died. Now, they weren't all climate change or weather-related, but a lot of them were due to that. About 800,000 people were displaced and there was about \$500 billion of lost productivity.

So when I look and I think about our planning and I think about what I have to do with allies and partners and I look long-term, it's important that the countries in this region build the capabilities into their infrastructure to be able to deal with the types of things that—

Senator INHOFE. I'm sorry to interrupt you here, because you've now used up half my time and we didn't get around to it. Is it safe to say that in the event that this—that the climate is changing, which so many of the scientists disagree with—in fact, when the Boston Globe, coming out of Massachusetts, made that statement, perhaps arguably one of the top scientists in the country, Richard Lindzen, also from Massachusetts, MIT, said that was laughable.

Let me just put it this way. In the event that we—well, first of all, CRS has told us that we could be totally independent from all other countries in terms of providing our own energy if we just develop our own resources. I believe that to be true. Wouldn't it be a more secure world and specifically in your area if we not only were totally independent, but were able to supply our allies in your jurisdiction with their energy so they don't have to depend on other sources?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Absolutely.

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Let me say something about China. China, I understand right now—this is fairly new stuff—that they're talking about increasing their defense budget by 10.7 percent in 2013. I remember back in the 1990s when they increased their defense spending during that decade by 300 percent at the same time that we reduced ours by about 30 percent. This is not a partisan thing. This was after the Cold War. A lot of people felt that we could afford to reduce and we did.

But that was we went down 30 percent in that decade. They went up 300 percent. Now we're facing the same thing. My concern is could it be that we will cease to become the partner of choice to our allies if this trend continues? Does this concern you with the amount of increase that China is making and how it's affecting your region?

We see this in Africa. It's our experience in Africa that every time we have any type of a void that takes place in Africa China moves in, and they seem to have the resources to do that. I just

want to know how that might affect our relationship with our allies in your jurisdiction?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, it is concerning, and I think one of the aspects of the rebalance is to ensure that we have the right force posture, the right force mixture for the future in the Asia-Pacific so that we can reassure our allies, that we can reassure our partners, we can reassure the American people that our interests are protected over there. I think we do have to watch very carefully how the China military rises, what they do with that military, and how that military is integrated into the security environment.

Senator INHOFE. In our trip over to Guam, we talked—we were looking at that controversial hangar and the fact that you'd made a statement that maybe that should be hardened. There's a big expense to that. That's a controversial thing over there. I would agree with your statement. However, with the resources that we have I would think that others would say, these need to be hardened also.

Would you kind of address that issue in terms of the scarce resources and the advantages of hardening those facilities?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes, sir. First, we're acutely aware of the significance of the resources that we'd be asking for. It really boils down to resiliency. It's not just about hardening. It's resiliency of forward bases as you look to the future, where in this case you are looking at Guam. It is a significant strategic hub for us in any scenario I think that I would see in the Asia-Pacific for the next number of decades as far as I can see forward.

So when you look at resiliency, there's really a number of components. There's offensive counter-air and how you use that. There's offensive methods to protect it. There's defensive measures to protect it. And then there are things that you might do to harden, and then there's command and control over it. We're looking across all of those.

So when you look at the things we're talking about hardening I think are those things that would allow you to be able to quickly, as quickly as possible, recover Guam if it ever were to be—if it ever were to be attacked by someone. It's not hardening everything, but it's hardening those things that would allow you to have that resiliency with some expectation you could return it to service quickly.

Senator INHOFE. I think it would be a good idea just for the record to elaborate on that, in what areas that should take place, kind of give us some ideas of some priorities. I know it's not of a lot of interest to this committee right now, but it was during our trip over there.

And it might also be true on this. Taking the 9,000 Marines from Okinawa, going to Guam and I think some of them to Australia and some to Hawaii, there is some issue there in terms of the real estate that that would free up for the Japanese. Is there any comment, brief comment, you can make about that move of those Marines?

Then I'd like to have for the record some of the detail in terms of where the remaining I guess about 10,000 Marines would be, where they'd be moved to, how that affects the value of the real estate there, and how we might be addressing that.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Let me begin by the question of resiliency in Guam and you said some more detail on that. I think generally I

would say when you look at fuel supplies and how you would regenerate fuel supplies and whether those fuelheads would need to be hardened or not, is one we look at; whether you have the right runway recovery equipment if the runways were ever damaged by someone who decided to attack Guam and how fast you could recover them. So those are a couple of things we're looking at.

We're also looking at how you would command and control the dispersal of assets so those assets might go to different places in times of crisis and conflict. So we're looking at a broad spectrum and these are just things that fit together in that patchwork.

Senator INHOFE. Because of the timing, if you can just go ahead and answer the other one for the record that would be fine, Admiral.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Aye, sir.

Senator INHOFE. Thanks so much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral, for your service. I was struck in your testimony at page 9 where you describe the growing number of nations adopting the submarine as sort of an enhanced weapon system. You point out the Russians in the north have both attack and ballistic missiles, indeed that India is growing its submarine force, the Chinese seem to be the ones who are expanding the most. Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Republic of Korea have launched new submarines.

This seems to be the class of weapon systems or ships that they are actively trying to compete with the United States; is that a fair judgment?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I don't know that I would say they were actively competing with the United States. I think globally you have well over 300 submarines and that number's growing. People recognize that they have a significant anti-access, denial, or anti-access capability, that there remains an asymmetric ability in undersea warfare in the ability to remain covert, in stealth; and that technology is allowing very quiet submarines to be built that can be sustained at sea for longer and longer periods of time.

So I don't know that they're necessarily competing with the United States because 300 submarines is a lot, but they certainly are I think re-emerging into the security environment in a way that we should be very thoughtful about.

Senator REED. But in terms of our fleet, which is clearly because of technology and also the skill of the men and women who operate these vessels, is far superior, but no longer do we have in one sense kind of an open field. We are now beginning and you're beginning to note an increase in submarines that are being developed and deployed by Asian powers. That's the sum of your testimony?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, first of all let me say that we have the very best submarines in the world, so I'm not concerned about the capabilities of our submarines or the crews that operate them. I am concerned about—numbers matter and where you have them matters and the types of missions. Our submarines do a variety of mis-

sions across the broad spectrum of things, and there are places in the world where an asymmetric advantage from undersea warfare is important.

Senator REED. It seems to be important, on the basis of your comment, in the context of the anti-access doctrine. Is that what you're perceiving to be the major emphasis now in Asia of particularly the major powers like China and others being in line, to be able to deny access to our fleet?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I would say there's a general trend around the globe, is that people want to be able to control what happens in their economic zones and in their territorial seas. Then there are those powers that like to project power even beyond those areas, and that submarines provide them viable alternatives for doing that in a way that's sometimes asymmetric.

Senator REED. One other, shifting gears slightly, is that the Littoral Combat Ship, the *Freedom*, I believe, has been deployed to Singapore, which is in your area of operations. We're going to have issues with respect to budgets and the capability of different ships. How do you—do you intend to monitor the operation of the *Freedom*, or how are you going to employ it, since it's in your AO?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. First, the *Freedom*, as you know, is the first of the class of the Littoral Combat Ship. It's a concept ship, something that was started out to build it and then to grow the R and D in it as you built it. The CNO I think has wisely decided to push it to PACOM and to rotationally deploy it out of Singapore.

It is a ship that was designed for littoral operations because of its speed, its shallow draft. It has the ability to be, over time, to be reconfigured. It has mission module packages that you are all aware of. What it does for me out there, number one, it provides a more—it provides a visible presence of the U.S. in the littorals. It allows us to cooperate and participate with a key strategic partner out there, our partners in Singapore. It provides my Seventh Fleet commander and my Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Haney, another tool in the toolkit to be able to deal with peacetime events as well as those in crisis. So I'm anxious to get it out to the theater and to see what it can actually do.

Senator REED. In that context, do you have a conscious plan to evaluate its capabilities, to make recommendations with respect to both its design, its function, and its operational capacities?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. We do. It'll be—the *Freedom* will be there for about ten months in this first rotation to the area. During that time, my understanding is that we will concentrate on how do we move the mission module packages around, how do we employ them in the littorals, how do we integrate them into the operational fleet, the Seventh Fleet.

So it's a good thing because it gets it into the real world. It gets it to having to see what it can do and how it can best perform and how it can best be used.

Senator REED. Just a final question. When you're doing your planning for a range of operations from noncombatant evacuations all the way up to a main fight or a forced landing, will you sort of think in terms of where the Littoral Combat Ship fits in those missions and what missions it may or may not be adequate for?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Absolutely. I think they are, from my other components, they're all looking very carefully at what they can use, how they can use the Littoral Combat Ship, because of its reconfigurable capability, because of the amount of cargo and types of things it can carry, the flexibility that it has with airframes. So we'll be looking at that.

We'll also be looking carefully at its mine countermeasure mission, which is an integral part of I believe the Navy strategy for next generation mine countermeasures, and we're going to ensure that those technologies are looked at as carefully as we can.

Senator REED. Finally, with the remaining minute or so, can you comment about the amphibious capability that you have in the Pacific now? Because of the Marines' deployment in Afghanistan and their service there, the frequency of amphibious operations from ship to shore have been curtailed over time. Have they been reinvigorated? Are you conducting them on a regular basis, and what are the problems you see?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. They have been reinvigorated. I think one of the initial impacts of the rebalance was to see the Marine forces, that many of them had been deployed into Afghanistan and the Middle East over the last decade, returned to the Pacific. So General Amos, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I have had extensive conversations about how do we bring back the Marines, reintegrate them back on the amphibious ships that we have there, what are the type of missions that we need to pursue, what is the level of training, what are the exercises we need to be incorporating.

So we have a good plan. I've asked the Navy to look at increasing the amount of amphibious lift that's in the AOR because of the geographically distributed operations that Marines have to do. I think there's a need for more lift in the PACOM area and that has been I believe positively received and we'll look at options on how best to do that.

Senator REED. Thank you, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank you, Admiral, for being here. You mentioned the effect on sequestration and you were making certain adjustments to it. Are you going to be able to in your view adjust adequately to carry out your assigned missions in the medium and long term if sequestration continues on the path that it's on?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I would say that we'll have to closely assess globally the types of things that our military's being asked to do, and then we'll have to decide—

Senator MCCAIN. I'm asking for the Pacific Command.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I think it would depend on how over time if the resources were reprioritized to the rebalance. I mean, I think at the end of the sequestration we'll still have the most powerful military in the world, I expect. So it will depend on how we're going to reprioritize that and whether that comes back to the Pacific. But it will be a challenge.

Senator MCCAIN. My question is not whether we will still have the most powerful military in the world. My question is, will you

be able to carry out the assigned missions that the Pacific Command has now in a sufficient manner to ensure our national security if sequestration continues on the path that it's on.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I mean, I hate to give you this, but I think it depends on—

Senator MCCAIN. You know what the numbers are, Admiral.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. You know what the numbers are and you know then that those numbers in some way or another are going to have to be put into effect. My question again is: Will you be able to ensure the American people that you will carry out your assigned security requirements to defend this Nation if sequestration continues the path that it's on?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I'd have to give you the answer is it depends on how the resources globally are prioritized and if they're prioritized to the Pacific.

Senator MCCAIN. So I guess the answer is that sequestration is okay as long as we prioritize in the proper fashion. Is that the answer you're giving this committee?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. No, sir. I've been consistent in saying that sequestration would have a catastrophic effect on our ability to do the type of global operations we're doing today. To tell you that sequestration is something that I would be supportive of in general, I would say no, I have not said that. But now that sequestration appears to be heading in that direction, at least in the near term, then there will be decisions that the Department of Defense will be forced to make.

I believe Secretary Hagel and Secretary Carter are moving in that direction to start to look at what are those strategic choices that have to be made. And if the strategic choice is that we cannot—that we're not going to be able to provide the force levels that we have today in the PACOM, then the answer to your question is I can't do it. The answer is if they're going to reprioritize to the Asia-Pacific, then I'd have—I'll have to see, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much. Thank you.

I was thinking this morning, I don't know of a time of greater tension since the end of the Korean War that exists today between North Korea, South Korea, and us. Would you agree with that?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I would agree that in my recollection I don't know a greater time.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you believe that we have the ability to intercept a missile if the North Koreans launch a missile, as it is widely reported they would do in coming days?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I believe we have a credible ability to defend the homeland, to defend Hawaii, defend Guam, to defend our forward-deployed forces and defend our allies.

Senator MCCAIN. Do we have the capability to intercept a missile if the North Koreans launch within the next several days?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. We do.

Senator MCCAIN. Would you recommend such action?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. If the missile was in defense of the homeland, I would certainly recommend that action. And if it was defense of our allies, I would recommend that action.

Senator MCCAIN. My question is would you recommend that we intercept a missile if it is launched by North Korea, no matter where the intended target is?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I would not recommend that.

Senator MCCAIN. Until you were sure what the target is?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I think, as you know, if you look at the architectures that we have, we will be able to sense and be able to understand pretty quickly where any launch from anywhere in the world, but in this case from this particular site, where it would probably—where it would be going and what we would need to do about it. So I am confident that we would be able to make that decision for the defense of our allies and our homeland.

Senator MCCAIN. So in the event of a missile launch you would wait until you could determine where the missile was aimed?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, we should hopefully have—if we have any predetermined I and W, we'll have a good—we should have a sense of where it's going to be aimed. If we don't, it doesn't take long for us to determine where it's going and where it's going to land.

Senator MCCAIN. We see that China made some rather cautionary remarks about North Korea. We see China—we now identify a building in Beijing from which cyber attacks emanate. We also see continued confrontational behavior on the part of China as far as its assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea. Would you agree with me that the only really restraining force on North Korea would be at this time the Chinese?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I would say that they would play—will play a key part in any restraint. I don't know the only one, but I would say they are a significant factor.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you think they have played a sufficient role of restraint of North Korea yet?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I think that they could do more.

Senator MCCAIN. So are you concerned about this combination of factors about Chinese behavior, that they certainly are not behaving in many respects as a world power should behave, especially again in light of the military buildup that Senator Inhofe has already described?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I do have some concerns.

Senator MCCAIN. And how serious are those concerns?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I think that as the Chinese military evolves, which I think it will evolve—and I'm not over—it doesn't surprise me that they're investing in their military. They're getting global aspirations because of their economic growth. The question is for me about transparency and what they're going to do with that military and how they integrate that military into the rest of the security environment.

So it does concern me. They know my concerns. I voice them when we meet together, and we continue to have dialogue on those concerns.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you have adequate missile defense resources to defend the homeland, including Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, the Secretary of Defense has announced some additional missile buys for the GBI's. But today we

have the capacity, the capability and a limited capacity to be able to defend against the type of threat that we're seeing from North Korea.

Senator MCCAIN. Isn't it true that this concern about North Korea is exacerbated by the fact that artillery at the DMZ could strike Seoul and cause horrendous casualties?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. It is very much exasperated by that because of the legacy of the DMZ and how that has progressed for the last 50 or 60 years. That amount of artillery, through a miscalculation or a provocation from the North, would put Seoul at risk and it is a primary concern of U.S. Forces Korea and mine.

Senator MCCAIN. This committee noted with interest the announcement that the governments of Japan and the United States announced for Okinawa movements, that has already been mentioned by the chairman and Senator Inhofe. We are awaiting a master plan for the movement and what's required and the costs required, including environmental impact assessments. When do you think the committee and the Congress would receive this master plan?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I don't have a date to give you for when OSD would present that to you. I've been providing the information to them as required from my perspective and I think I've responded to the committee on a number of issues that you've asked me about, including the lift requirements necessary to move the Marines around, and I submitted that to the committee within the last two weeks.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. I thank you, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

Senator Blumenthal.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral, for your service, your extraordinary service over many, many many years and for being here today and for your excellent testimony.

I am concerned as much about the threat that North Korea poses in terms of nuclear proliferation over the long term as the immediate tension and potential threat in the short term. You have briefly discussed it in your testimony. We have discussed it barely at all here today. So I wonder if you could elaborate on your testimony to describe what you see as the extent of the ongoing, and I underscore the word "ongoing," aid that North Korea is providing to other nuclear-arming countries such as Iran around the world? Then I'm going to ask how we can stop it more effectively, as you've described, through the counter-weapons of mass destruction program and what can we do, what can we do to bolster it?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. North Korea's proliferation of weapons systems, including potentially missile technologies or nuclear technologies, very much concern me. We know that over the period of time that North Korea goes through cycles of provocation. One of the things they rely on to fund their ability to do what they do is through proliferation and movement of arms sales around the world.

I don't have any direct knowledge that there's been in this near-term case, that there's been collusion between Iran and North Korea, but it doesn't mean it hasn't happened.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Isn't it a fact that Iran would be greatly disadvantaged if North Korea were not helping it?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I think that Iran would be greatly advantaged if North Korea helps them.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Is that help ongoing?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I can't give you a verification of that in this forum, but I'd be happy to—

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Perhaps in another forum.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you.

What can we do to help stop that kind of proliferation even more effectively than we are right now through the counter-weapons of mass destruction program?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I think first the international community has got to bring pressure, continued pressure to bear on North Korea. We have to tighten our ability to sense and see what is being proliferated and where it's going, and then we have to be able to ensure that we have the ability to interdict it before it is proliferated.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, I will just say, Admiral—and I know you are focused on this problem, as evidenced by your testimony here—but for me some of the most chilling testimony this year before our committee came from Admiral Stavridis, who told us—and I'm quoting: "Remember, the truly dark edge of the spectrum is weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of these weapons." Then he said that "the ability to move ten tons of cocaine in a minisub, if you have that ability you can also move a nuclear device."

So the seas are a ready means of proliferating nuclear arms that can do destruction beyond what we have seen so far through weapons of terrorism, isn't that correct?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Certainly the seas, and in particular my area of responsibility, are the highways for a lot of type of activities. Some don't just recognize just the size of the Pacific Ocean. If you took all the land masses in the world and put them together, they'd all fit in the Pacific Ocean.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And you stated that well in your testimony, the sheer physical extent of your challenge. With that in mind—and I didn't mean to cut you off, but I do hope that we can be rebriefed, perhaps with your guidance as well as others, on the threat of proliferation particularly as it concerns Iran going forward.

Let me just shift to a subject that Senator Reed raised, submarines. This goes really to the end of your last question. There are 300 submarines out there now and they can't compare to the United States in terms of their technological capability or the ability of the personnel who man them, I agree with you totally.

But don't we need to continue our sub-building program at the rate we are now of two a year to keep pace with what's happening in the rest of the world?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. That's been my recommendation.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And nothing has happened to change that recommendation, has it?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Nothing's happened to change that recommendation.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. In fact, arguably the urgency of that recommendation is all the more present now in the world with the increasing building of those submarines by other countries around the world.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I would—it's not only about the submarines. Our submarine force does a lot of other things, from intelligence and reconnaissance to special operations support. So it's a wide array of things that need to be addressed in the security environment that can be addressed very well by a competent submarine force that has the capability and the capacity to be able to address the growing challenges we see in the world today.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you.

Finally, you mentioned in your testimony just very briefly the challenges posed by human trafficking in the region under your command. I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit on that, particularly focusing on whether it's increasing or not, human trafficking, sex exploitation, particularly affecting children, young women, the range and increasing extent of it.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I have a slide that somebody gave me the other day. I don't know if it's accurate or not, but it said that the slave trade in the world today, that it's about \$30 billion a year. So in my particular AOR, my guess is that there's a fair amount of that trafficking coming from that part of the world.

So we do look at this. We try to work with our partners, our allies, to look at where the sources of this type of trafficking might be coming from, what are the security mechanisms they may have in place to be able to help deal with it. But it is a problem and I think a much larger problem than we often want to think about.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Isn't the Republic of North Korea a primary contributor to this problem?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I don't have the knowledge of that.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. My information is that in fact they are a primary contributor to human trafficking of women and girls, both within that country and the industry, particularly through Mexico and Canada. Are you aware of information that would corroborate that?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I'm not aware of it, but I'll certainly look into your numbers. But I wouldn't be surprised.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I apologize, I don't have numbers. But if you have some, I certainly welcome any additional information that you might be able to provide.

My time has expired, but I really want to thank you for your very informative and helpful testimony here today. Thank you, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.

Senator Ayotte.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral, for your leadership and for all that serve underneath you. I wanted to ask you, what is the relationship be-

tween China and North Korea, and how does North Korea depend upon China?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. China is I think de facto the only real, so to speak, ally that North Korea would have. They are on their border. They share a common border. I believe that China economically supports North Korea through food and fuel and water. I think that there are diplomatic ties between North Korea, unlike—they are much more robust than what we may have ever experienced with North Korea. So I think their influence in North Korea is and can be significant.

Senator AYOTTE. Wouldn't it be—as I understand it, in fact China is North Korea's biggest trading partner, their main source of food, arms to some extent, and fuel. So it seems to me that North Korea would have a difficult time continuing economically, even at their lower economic development pace as they are now, given the starving that many of the North Koreans experience, if they didn't have China's support. Would you agree with me with that?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I would have to agree with that. I mean, the North Korea economy is about 2 percent of the South Korean economy.

Senator AYOTTE. So one thing that—when you look at what's happened in the last couple of weeks with the new leader of North Korea and his bellicose actions, which seem to go beyond their typical cycle of provocation that we've seen in the past with his father, couldn't China play a key role in getting North Korea to stop their actions?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I would think that China could play a key role in influencing the bellicose rhetoric and restoring some more sense of calm to the peninsula. Of course, I believe sometimes the Chinese in the way they approach it are more nuanced than we are. I believe there's been some reporting and some indication that the leadership in China has made some statements about the issue. I can't tell you what's going on behind the scenes between Beijing and—

Senator AYOTTE. Well, one thing that troubled me is that when you were asked by Chairman Levin about your conversations with your Chinese counterpart in the military you said during these past two very dangerous weeks that we've had with North Korea that you have not had contacts with your military counterpart. It seems to me that we need to be, I would think, clearer with China as to what our expectations are because this is a danger to them, and also if there is a provocation between North and South Korea and we are required to engage, or North Korea engages us, that is to the detriment of China's security as well.

So I'm wondering why you haven't had those conversations.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I believe our Secretary of Defense has had those conversations. The nature of our mil-to-mil with China is growing and is progressing and I believe that over time we will progress to a state where the PACOM commander can talk to the chief of defense or the Chairman can talk there in real time. We're not there yet. We'd like to get there with them.

But I can't tell you—I'd have to refer you to the State Department. I know that there's a different flow of information at the dip-

lomatic level than at the military level because of the way the PLA is structured.

Senator AYOTTE. I'm sorry to interrupt, but do you know what conversations that Secretary Hagel has had with his counterpart in China to get them to stop this? It seems to me that the Chinese could get North Korea to back off tomorrow.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I don't know the specifics of it, but I believe that there has been outreach at that level. I believe there has.

Senator AYOTTE. I think that's particularly important, given that North Korea relies on China essentially for its economic existence almost.

I wanted to ask you, with the thought of stopping the proposed Minuteman, which is a preplanned ICBM test that we had, you had said you agreed with that decision. Was there any thought to the fact that if we stopped a proposed test that we were planning on doing anyway that North Korea might interpret that as their actions having an impact on us backing off, meaning that his belligerent actions were actually getting us to stop actions with our own ICBM testing? What was the thought process there about the other side of stopping?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I'm sure that entered into the discussions about when the decision was made. I would just say that we have many, many tools available that demonstrate U.S. power and resolve and that we use those selectively, particularly as we're trying to make sure that we don't end up with a situation that spirals out of control on the Korea Peninsula.

So I think there's no question that we have the capability to demonstrate at will, when we want to, ability to defend our own people, defend the peninsula. So I was supportive of the decision at the time it was made.

Senator AYOTTE. At some point we're going to have to go forward with our regular testing, though, because this isn't something that we just planned for this. It's something that we do regularly, isn't that right?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Absolutely.

Senator AYOTTE. Can I ask you about the 14 ground-based interceptors that are now being placed, replaced. As you know, the prior administration had planned to put those interceptors in place in Alaska to make sure that we had the missile defense capability that was needed. How long will it take for that to be put in place?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I don't have an answer for you. I can refer to STRATCOM and get you one, though.

Senator AYOTTE. Is that a matter of years, though, to build those, to get those in place?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I would assume that it's longer than days.

Senator AYOTTE. Right. So obviously, not having gone forward, this administration, with what the prior administration had planned, in 2009 has delayed some capacity that we now believe we need; is that right?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I don't have really a comment on that.

Senator AYOTTE. Okay, thank you.

I wanted to also ask you about in particular the importance of the *Virginia*-class submarine. I know that Richard Blumenthal, Senator Blumenthal, had asked you about the need to continue the

current build, payload schedule. Is that payload schedule under threat with sequestration?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I think that as we look at sequestration that they're going to look at—as the Secretary of Defense has said, we have to look at all options and all things that are out there, and to see what's affordable and within the context of what the American people want to provide us for defense. So I think it will get looked at and it will stand on its own merits as far as what we expect our submarine force to do in a sequestered budget.

Senator AYOTTE. Is there any doubt, though, that we need that *Virginia*-class attack submarine capability in light of, obviously, what's happening in the Asia-Pacific region and in other regions around the world, including obviously what is happening in the Middle East?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. In my mind there's no doubt that we need to *Virginia*-class submarine and we need it to be able to employ a wide range of capabilities. They are all important. In my particular area of responsibility I have to look at what are the capabilities that are most important, and we'll be doing that.

Senator AYOTTE. I appreciate it.

Thank you, Admiral, for your testimony and I appreciate your being here today.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.

Senator Donnelly.

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, thank you for your service. The North Korean missile that's been moved to their east coast, what is the capability of that? What parts of American territory are under threat from that, if any, and what countries are under threat from that?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, we believe, as has been widely reported, that there's been a Musudan movement to the east coast. A Musudan has a range of roughly 3,000 miles, 3,500 miles, has a minimum range of about 400 or so miles, is what we think. So you can just extrapolate that out. It doesn't put the homeland, the mainland of the United States, at risk. It doesn't put Hawaii. It could put, I assume, if it was pointed in that direction, could put Guam at risk.

But let me reiterate again, we've got the capability in place to be able to monitor and be able to protect the homeland, protect Guam, and protect our forces that are fielded there, as well as our allies.

Senator DONNELLY. How quickly are you aware if a launch occurs?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, this is complicated, the scenario, over time. In the past we had significant I and W to be able to—indications and warnings to be able to understand the direction of the launch, where it was at. So the introduction of road-mobile systems creates a problem for our intelligence, meaning—and the world knows this. This is not just a North Korea problem. This is a global issue with road-mobile systems.

So it puts pressure on our ability, a premium on our ability to sense and understand what's going on and to see it and to be able to respond to it. We would like from a military perspective to be able to sense it and be able to, if we have to, deal with it before

it ever launched. But in this case, in the scenario we're in, we're probably looking at being able to see it being in the general location and then to sense a launch and then to do what's necessary to defend if that was required.

Senator DONNELLY. At what point do you have to launch to protect our allies and our own territories?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. That would be speculation, Senator. I mean, it's—it would depend on the location of the launch. It would depend on the geometry of where it was going. It would depend on where the assets were located. So we will position our forces to optimize our capabilities in that area.

Senator DONNELLY. Do you feel confident we'll be able to protect all of our territories and our friends.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I feel confident, I do.

Senator DONNELLY. In regards to the decisionmaking in North Korea with their new leader, what is—what differences do you see from his father to him?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I think first the similarities. I think he's taken the playbook probably from his "Military First." I mean, it's a government that's organized around the military, and he's played that hard to the people of North Korea. He has indicated that he was going to do economic reform, which we haven't seen anything of.

He has bought from that playbook from his father a recognition of a cycle of provocation, where they go through—they do an event, there's bellicose rhetoric, it builds and it builds until the international community says, I've had enough, and they go into some dialogue, he asks for concessions, the concessions are either given or not, and then it kind of hangs out there for a while, and then starts back up again.

Over time, I believe that that cycle of provocation has been a fairly successful strategy for them. They're still in power.

Now, where they differ is that I think our observation is that he's unpredictable, more unpredictable. His father and his grandfather as far as I can see always figured into their provocation cycle an off-ramp of how to get out of it, and it's not clear to me that he has thought through how to get out of it. So that's what makes this scenario I think particularly challenging.

Senator DONNELLY. Is there a tipping point for the Chinese with the North Koreans? What I mean by that, is there a point where they will look or speak to the generals of North Korea and say: Look, this is a point we don't want you to go past. Do they have that kind of influence?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I think that they have that kind of influence, and I think there will be a point, would be a point in time where you would see more of that probably visible than you might have seen to this point in time. But we share with the Chinese similar interests. We don't want—we want peace and security on the peninsula. There's no benefit to the Chinese of having this type of activity occurring on their borders. There's no possible benefit that I can see from this.

So they will, I believe, in time work this problem to their national interest, just like we do and the South Koreans do.

Senator DONNELLY. Do they have the ability—obviously, they have the physical ability to do it, but do they have the will or desire, do you think, if the North Koreans go past a point we would have expected them to go past in this, do the Chinese have the ability to force a change in North Korea in the leadership there?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I don't know that they have—that they would say they have the ability to force a change. My sense is that they will look after their national interest and that they would at some point in time, if North Korea is not in the best interest—activity is not in the best interest of their national interest, they will act to preserve their national interest, as we would.

Senator DONNELLY. Outside of the Korean Peninsula, what do you see as the biggest challenge in your region? What is the situation that concerns you the most outside of the Korean Peninsula?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, certainly as we look at the rise of regional powers, the rise of China—and I've said this before in testimony in other forums—it's looking to a future where the U.S. interests are protected, that our allies are protected in the Asia-Pacific. But we have to also expect that China will integrate into that security environment. They have to. There's really not another good option.

So how we do that and how we are able to assist where we can—"assist" is a pretty soft word—how we can help China assume the regional role, a regional role in the security environment, which I think they will at some point in time, that is consistent with U.S. interests there and the interests of our allies is a concern to me of how we get there and the road we're on to that.

Senator DONNELLY. Do you see the contesting of islands, of territories, not only with Japan but with other countries as well in regards to China, do you see that as getting worse or is that situation getting worked out better? How do you see that moving forward?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, you know in the South China Sea the Philippine government filed an international tribunal under UNCLOS, which I thought was—I was supportive of that when they did that. I believe that, first, we don't take sides. That's our U.S. policy on territorial disputes. But we do have an opinion and the opinion is that they should be resolved using normal standards of international rule, that they should be done peacefully, without coercion, and that in the end it should be in the best interests of all the partners in that region.

So in the South China Sea I think we have—we are at a, I would say, kind of a low boil, is probably the best way I'd put it, is that we're watching carefully what happens as each of these peripheral countries look at how they're going to secure their interests.

In the East China Sea with the Senkakus, we're clear as well there. We don't again take sides on territorial disputes. But we do recognize that the Senkakus falls in the administrative boundary of Japan and that falls under our alliance and our treaty responsibilities with them. So we are hoping again that over time that this scenario can play out to the benefit of both Japan and China, to the degree they can ever get there, because they do have many, many interests together that I think over time may eclipse this event, but they have to get through it. And hopefully that's done peacefully.

Senator DONNELLY. Admiral, thank you for your service and for your testimony today.

Senator NELSON [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.

Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, sir.

Admiral, again thank you for your service.

If you looked out over a 10-year window and sequestration was fully implemented, we would have 232 ships left in the Navy a decade from now. Is that a wise thing?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Not a wise thing.

Senator GRAHAM. Would it severely restrict our ability to deal with the threat that you face today in your backyard; do you agree with that?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Unless you put them all in my AOR. I'd probably be okay if you put them all there.

Senator GRAHAM. But somebody else wouldn't be.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. But somebody else wouldn't be.

Senator GRAHAM. Fair enough.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Now, what percentage of North Korea's GDP is dependent on their relationship with China?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I don't have that at my fingertips, but I imagine a fair percentage, and I can give you a number.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, I'd appreciate that. The point I'm trying to make is that basically North Korea's a client state of China and they could stop this if they chose to in my view.

We're ready for the fight with North Korea if that day ever comes?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. We're ready.

Senator GRAHAM. South Korea and Japan, do they believe we have their back?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. In my sessions with my counterparts, the answer to that is yes.

Senator GRAHAM. The politics in South Korea has changed, would you agree, where the tolerance by the South Korean government and people to accept any more attacks against South Korean interests is much lower than it was two years ago, do you agree with that?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I would agree that their toleration of a significant provocation towards the South is much lower than it has been in the past.

Senator GRAHAM. If there were an incident where a South Korean naval vessel was sunk by North Korea, a South Korean island was shelled where South Korean citizens were killed, or a South Korean plane was shot down by the North Koreans, it would be almost impossible for the South Koreans not to respond in some fashion; do you agree with that?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, you'd have to ask, to get a real answer, the South Koreans. But my sense is, and I think General Thurman would probably agree, is that there is a growing sense in South Korea that future provocations of the level you just described would require them to respond in some way.

Senator GRAHAM. From our own national security interests, a nuclear-armed North Korea sharing technology with terrorist groups is a real concern; do you agree with that?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. One of the greatest concerns.

Senator GRAHAM. And we should be concerned about a missile attack coming from North Korea and I applaud the administration for showing resolve. I think all the things you have done under Secretary Hagel's direction have been good, the right signal to send.

But it is more than just getting hit by a North Korean missile that I'm concerned about. A North Korea with an advanced nuclear weapons program is probably a nightmare for this country, because they have shown a propensity to share the technology with terrorist groups. Is that a fair statement?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. A fair statement.

Senator GRAHAM. Do the North Koreans have a rational bone in their body?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I would say that over time that you could, if you look at—the armistice was in place the year before I was born, so over time they're still in power. So there must have been some rationality from their perspective of what they're doing.

Senator GRAHAM. I think from their perspective this is rational if you live like kings and most people are starving to death. And when you get to the bottom of a North Korean problem you have to go back to China in my view, because this North Korean regime could not last six months under the current construct without support from China. Do you agree with that?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I believe that North Korea is highly dependent on China for a lot of its resources. I don't know how long they would survive.

Senator GRAHAM. Not long.

Do you agree that China must have a plan for propping up this crazy regime?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I don't know that—

Senator GRAHAM. They're not doing it by accident. They know who they're giving the money to, right?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. They do, they do. And it's a long—

Senator GRAHAM. What is their plan? I mean, tell me the best you can? You're one of our eyes and ears in that part of the world. As briefly as possible, tell me, why does China continue to do this? How does this fit into their plan for the planet?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I would say that, speculating on China, my perspective of China's position on it is that over the last—

Senator GRAHAM. Have you ever asked them?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. We've talked about the situation on the peninsula—

Senator GRAHAM. Have you ever asked them, why do you support this crazy guy? Why do you do this? What's in it for you?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, my sense is that over time that they've developed this relationship with North Korea as a buffer to U.S. presence in South Korea on the peninsula.

Senator GRAHAM. Don't you think it's a little deeper than that, that they worry about a unified Korea, another democracy in their backyard?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I don't know that I would agree that they are—you'd have to ask them. I don't know that I'd agree that they're worried about a democracy. They have a pretty vibrant relationship with South Korea, actually a strategic relationship economically.

Senator GRAHAM. So you think North Korea is a buffer?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. My sense is that they, again, that they may—

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Why do they engage in cyber attacks against American business interests?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. They do that so that they can get the technological advantage.

Senator GRAHAM. Why do they object to efforts to control the slaughter in Syria?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I don't have a comment on that.

Senator GRAHAM. Why do they not support us more in terms of controlling the ayatollahs in Iran?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I couldn't comment.

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I'll give you a comment. I think this is a communist dictatorship that fears individual expression. They fear freedom of thought. They fear freedom of religion. They fear anything not controlled by the state. And it is now time to deal with these people more directly.

Do you consider China a friend or a foe?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I consider them at this point in time, in the terms of those two terms, neither.

Senator GRAHAM. Well, with friends like this do you agree with don't need many enemies?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I consider them at this point in time someone we have to develop a strategic partnership with to manage competition between two world powers.

Senator GRAHAM. I'll be a little more direct. I know you're a military officer and I appreciate your service. Their behavior is not only provocative, it's obscene. They're stealing American intellectual property. They're attacking us every day through cyber space. They're propping up one of the most dangerous regimes in the world that directly threatens our interests. They're one of the groups having Assad's back, one of the last real vicious people on the planet—not one of the last, but certainly one of the major.

So you live in a tough neighborhood and I just wish you would share with the Chinese that there's a growing frustration here in Congress with the way they behave and we would like to have a more mature China as part of the international community, a China that would bring out the best in the world, not reinforce what's dangerous about it. I think I'm speaking for a lot of Republicans and Democrats.

Thank you for your service.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator HIRONO.

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to join my colleagues in welcoming you, Admiral Locklear, for the hearing today, very important. Thank you for your leadership, and of course I want to thank the men and women who serve with you at PACOM. I visited with many of our leaders this

past week and so I know how hard they work. And the fact that they are very much a part of the community through volunteering and particularly with our schools.

I have a question regarding Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. With the new strategy to rebalance our forces with a focus on the Asia-Pacific, the need for a strategically located maintenance facility such as the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard appears even more critical to the readiness of our fleet. When I visited Pearl Harbor, one of our attack submarines was in drydock and I saw the huge effort and the hundreds of people who have to work to maintain our submarines.

Do you foresee any adjustment to the role that you see Pearl Harbor Shipyard playing with this rebalancing, as well as the importance of continuing the modernization efforts at the shipyard, because I know that we need to modernize that shipyard in order for them to work on these very, very, highly sophisticated submarines in order to support the fleet in the future? Can you share your thoughts with us on that?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes. I know of no plans to change the strategic direction we're headed with Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. In this area of responsibility we have to have geographically distributed capabilities. They have to be operationally—you've heard this term—operationally resilient, and they have to be able to respond in crisis. But they also have to be affordable.

So I assume that the changes we're going to make in the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard will continue to make it competitive in nature. But certainly what they produce for us from a military perspective from the PACOM perspective is important and will continue to be important.

Senator HIRONO. I hope that means that you will continue to support the efforts to modernize that shipyard so that they can conduct the kind of highly technical work that they do there.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, for them to remain operationally resilient they have to be able to do the type of work that I would need them do. If that requires them to modernize, then we'll need to do that.

Senator HIRONO. They do need to modernize. Some of the equipment seems to be under tents.

When we talk about the importance of the Asia-Pacific area and the rebalancing to that area—I just participated in a tea ceremony with Dr. Sen of the Uransenke tea group and their focus is peace through the way of the tea. So our relationship with Japan is very, very important. Can you talk about the current status of our alliance with Japan, which is a critical alliance in light of everything that is happening in the Asia-Pacific area?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes, it is a cornerstone alliance, at least from the security perspective. Our relationship with Japan is equally as important today as it ever has been in the past and maybe more important. The strength of our mil-to-mil relationships and the strength of our military alliance and training together is as strong as it's ever been and it's getting better.

Their capabilities both from a joint command and control perspective, their capabilities to participate in high-end things like ballistic missile defense of their own territories, is growing. I see

a continued good way ahead with our relationship, mil-to-mil relationship with Japan.

Senator HIRONO. Would you say that one of the areas that we need to continue to focus on is the Futenma situation in Okinawa?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes. We've had recent good news where the government of Japan provided to the governor of Okinawa the landfill permit and they're having that under consideration. So that's the next step to go forward to be able to realize the Futenma replacement.

Senator HIRONO. I know that this committee has had numerous hearings on how we can facilitate and ensure that movement of marines happens in a way that is of benefit to both of our countries, not to mention what we need to do regarding Guam.

One of the areas that I've focused my questioning with other leaders from the military is your need to reduce your energy consumption, which the Department of Defense is the largest user of energy of all of our departments. So regarding your implementation of the DOD's operational energy strategy, I'm curious to know how this is progressing and what have been some of the successes of your implementation efforts? What have been the biggest challenges in your operational energy strategy efforts, and any lessons learned from the implementation of the strategy being integrated into PACOM's decisionmaking?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I'd like to give you a more complete answer if I can later on in writing to give—

Senator HIRONO. I welcome that.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Admiral LOCKLEAR.—a perspective on it.

But to the larger perspective, inside of DOD PACOM is the largest user inside of DOD of energy resources. The vastness of the AOR requires me to continually think about where the energy resources are and where they're going to come from. I have to think about how they're going to get refined, the quality that I need to put into the airplanes and the ships. I think about, have to think about how I'm going to move it around or get it moved around in this vast AOR. And I have to look to ensuring that the energy is going to be reliable when I get there, when I need it.

I also have to consider that I have locations throughout this vast area that many of them are remote, more remote locations that might be available to look at alternative energy supplies. So it remains a critical aspect of the way we think through the strategy and we are following DOD OSD's lead on looking at renewable energy sources, and you're familiar with many of them, and I think there has been some success in that area.

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. I think that's a very important strategy for us to pursue energy, lessening the energy usage in the Department of Defense.

Very briefly, I know that Senator Graham asked you some questions about China vis-a-vis North Korea. There's some indications that perhaps China is not too happy, perhaps displeased, with North Korea's rhetoric and actions. Do you foresee some action on the part of the Chinese either publicly or behind the scenes to stop or at least reduce the level of provocations from North Korea?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I think there's been statements by both Xi Jinping and by their minister I believe of foreign affairs in the last day or two that would indicate that they have some concerns about any disruption, continued provocations or disruptions in this part of the world or anything that would put a potential negative situation on their border.

So I think these are maybe not as direct as what we like to see here, but I believe that there are indications that the Chinese government is engaging. I think I'd have to refer you to the State Department to get more specifics on what the diplomatic channels are. But my sense is that they will consider their national interest, just like we do, and they will move to protect those national interests when the time comes.

Senator HIRONO. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hirono.

Senator KAINE.

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Admiral Locklear, welcome. I'm going to pick up on a theme. There's been a lot of questions about the relationship between China and North Korea and I just would like to associate myself with comments made by others. I wouldn't have wanted to answer that question that you were posed by Senator Graham, is China a friend or a foe. It reminded me I was once in Israel and asked the foreign minister of Israel the same question about the relationship between Israel and Russia. And he sort of groaned and he said: Well, it's a friendship, but it needs an awful lot of work.

We have extensive ties with China commercially and in many multilateral venues, obviously, and the relationship is probably just about the most important relationship between two nations in the world. But when you list those items of controversy that Senator Graham mentioned—the Chinese position vis-a-vis Syria, the completely flagrant cyber security attacks that can be testified to by any governmental agency, financial institution, or technology firm in this country will tell you about it occurring day after day after day, along with Chinese Government denials of the obvious reality, and then the situation in North Korea, it is clear that, while we have a friendship and an alliance and it's a very strategic one and it's important for the world, it needs a lot of work right now.

I just would like to associate myself with the comments of the Senators who have said I think the North Korean nuclear program would come to a grinding halt as soon as China demands that it happen. They have the capacity to. They have the ability to. They have the leverage to. I think you're right that the Chinese interest is in seeing North Korea as a buffer, but an unsafe, unstable buffer isn't much of a buffer.

At some point other nations in the Pacific region—South Korea, Japan, and others—will start to, because of the logical illogic of nuclear proliferation, will say: We don't want nuclear weapons, but if an unstable neighbor has them then I guess we're going to need to get them, too. And it would be the worst thing for China to face the prospect of additional nations in the area with nuclear weapons. Ultimately that is going to be what other nations will be compelled to do unless the North Korean program is stopped.

So this is a comment, but it's to kind of give you a sense of what we are thinking here as you deal with your counterparts in PACOM, Chinese counterparts and others. We feel like China can bring it to a stop. We feel like they have not chosen to do so. The day is coming where they will need to do that or they will face other nations with weapons that they'll not be happy to have near their borders if they do not act in the role that they should.

I just, having heard similar rounds of questioning in hearings before this one from Senator McCain and Senator Ayotte, Senator Graham, others who've asked these questions, this is the emerging consensus, I believe, of this body, this committee, many members of the committee, about China's responsibilities and where we will likely go. So I hope you would just take that in the "for what it's worth" category.

A question. You've been asked a couple of things about sequester. I visited Joint Base Langley-Eustis last week in Virginia and that is the home of the Air Force's Air Combat Command. I talked to the men and women who maintain F-22s on the very day the U.S. had deployed F-22s to Osan Air Force Base in South Korea as part of these joint military exercises.

We've had a remarkable show of force of both F-22s and B-2s to demonstrate that we're serious about the North Korean threat. But as we were doing that I was also being told, and I'm concerned about, Air Force plans to cut flying hours by 18 percent as a result of the sequester. Air Combat Command informed us that as of this week it will enter what they called a tiered readiness status. One-third of its flying units will cease flying or stand down for the remainder of fiscal year 2013.

How will that standdown or cessation or that tiered readiness of flying units affect your important and critical missions in PACOM?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, as I indicated earlier, the fact of sequestration at PACOM in the near-mid-term will be the degradation, potential degradation of readiness of our forces that would have to follow on. So what we've done in the near term is to ensure that we're able to manage the scenarios that are most important to us, in my case the North Korea, manage that, to manage our homeland defense.

But as the sequestration starts to move downstream we start to see more and more negative impacts on the readiness of our force. So what it means to Air Combat Command is that the forces that are back here, that are going to be training to get ready to come and relieve the ones that are on station, will not have adequate flying hours, will not have adequate training, potentially not have it. That's kind of the world that we're in right now.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I think it is important. Many of us were very pleased when we did the defense appropriations bill to carry forward through year end to replace the CR. But even with that, the notion that a third of our air combat units are standing down from now to year end is something that should cause us some significant anxiety. I know it worries me.

You talked a little bit and there was also some information in your testimony about the combined counter-provocation plan, which is a South Korea-led, U.S.-supported contingency plan for challenges in the region. I know that was just signed within the last

couple weeks, I think March 22. Could you share a little bit more about that contingency plan and what are some of the strategies for dealing with contingencies, including miscalculations or threats over skirmishes or threats that escalate in ways that we obviously wish they wouldn't?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, in all of our bilateral planning with our allies there, which we've been doing for years with them, and we continually evolve it based on the scenarios that we see in North Korea—this particular plan that you've heard about is just a follow-on iteration of our robust planning that we have. It's a look at the recognition that North Korea has established a cycle of provocation and then following the Chonan and the Yeongpyeong Island shelling a number of years ago, is that how do we best ensure that as this cycle of provocation were to occur, how do we together as allies communicate, how do we understand the situation, how do we share intelligence, how do we posture ourselves to be able to ensure that we can manage those scenarios.

I can't go into the details of it, but it's a good—from our perspective, it's a very good effort. It's an indication of a maturing of the alliance and I'm very supportive of the efforts that General Thurman and his counterpart in Korea have undertaken.

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Admiral.

Finally, your testimony discusses the continued challenge faced by the region because of typhoons, earthquakes, floods, tsunamis. What are you—what is PACOM doing to plan humanitarian assistance and disaster response with other nations and also with multilateral agencies and NGO's?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, certainly the military aspects of HADR—that's not why you have militaries. You have them to do other things. But they certainly can provide assistance in these areas, particularly early on in those type of events. So as we saw in Tomodachi in Japan, we saw where the readiness of military assets to kind of step in at the early stages of a huge crisis, a huge natural disaster, and to kind of get in front of the problem and get command and control set up and to give the people on the ground the will and the help they need to kind of get them jump-started to go solve it, because in the end Tomodachi was not solved by the U.S. military or any other allies. It was predominantly solved by the people of Japan. But it needed to get them started.

There's other areas that we can support. We have technologies and we have know-how that are in developed countries that we can share with developing countries. So in PACOM I'm able to bring together many inter-agencies from our U.S. government and we can transport some of that knowledge into these growing HADR scenarios that we do and exercises that we do with other countries.

So for instance, in Bangladesh over time they have been able to develop warning systems and places where people go during large storms that have significantly decreased the damage and cost in human life. So we can do some of those things in our multilateral planning together. Plus the whole idea of HADR is—many times in this large area we have to look for places where our interests converge to be able to participate with each other. In this case everybody can converge on HADR—the Chinese, the United States, everyone can. So you will see exercises where we're operating with

the Chinese, we're operating with others, the Indians, other people in the area, because we're going after a common cause. These things build trust and over time I think make us a stronger region.

Senator Kaine. Thank you very much for your testimony.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine.

Senator King.

Senator KING. Thank you for your thoughtful answers today. Are there treaty obligations between China and North Korea that we know of, a kind of mutual non-aggression or something like that?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I understand that there is an alliance of some mechanism there. I don't know the specifics of how it would be implemented, but I believe there is, that it's been widely speculated that North Korea is an ally vice versa of China.

Senator KING. Well, here's the scenario that keeps me up at night. The North Koreans torpedo a ship, a South Korean ship. The South Koreans, as you've testified, seem to have a higher level of intolerance for this kind of activity than they have in past, so there's a response from the South Koreans, some kind of strike in North Korea. There's then a response from North Korea of more severity in the South.

What happens next? What's worrying me here is the Guns of August phenomenon, Barbara Tuchman's famous study of the beginning of World War One, where we stumbled into a world war because of a series of alliances based upon what could be considered insignificant incidents.

What is next in that scenario? Let's posit an attack on Seoul or some large population area in South Korea. What happens next?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, first I share your concern about the seriousness of a provocation that would lead to a miscalculation or an escalation that would go kind of up and out pretty quickly. The time line from when you would go to where you would see a miscalculation that went kinetic, let's say, to the time that you could see significant combat activity from the North is a very short time line, primarily due to the proximity of Seoul and the South Korean rising economic state, a great ally there.

So it's hard for me to speculate exactly how those scenarios would play out. But what we have in place is the ability for the alliance to have—we've planned and thought through some of these events, in fact a lot of the events, and we have the ability to quickly consult with each other and to quickly bring the forces that would be necessary to hopefully—the idea would be to get it under control and to de-escalate it as fast as possible, so that in the end the best thing we as militaries can do is to preserve the peace, to get it back to peace so that diplomacy can work. We would hope that that could be done in North Korea.

But it is a very dangerous situation. I'm not going to go where Mrs. Tuchman went on the scenario and extrapolate that because I don't think it has to go there. But it is something we have to watch and it could be quite volatile.

Senator KING. It seems to me that the key to the situation is our relationship with China, which has come out over and over, in terms of their ability to be a partner here in restoring peace, as opposed to an enemy.

Let me ask a sort of general question about China. Why are they arming? Why are they building their military? Why are they diverting more resources? We've been attacked. We know that there are people around the world plotting against this country. Do they have any serious fear of someone attacking their homeland? What's driving them to militarize?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, first, they have a large standing army for internal security and border security issues that have worried them over time, is my guess. Then over the last number of decades, as they have become a more economic powerful nation and they have money and resources to do it, they have increased their emphasis in cyber, increased their emphasis in space, increased their emphasis in maritime capabilities, which I think if you pragmatically look at it we shouldn't be surprised by that.

They have growing global economic and national interests that are concerning them, and any nation state that has those needs to be able to ensure the security of them. In many ways you do that with navies and things that can deploy. So building an aircraft carrier, does that concern me? To the degree that—first of all, aircraft carriers are hard and expensive to operate. But to the degree that they get one, it would seem kind of a natural progression to me on a power that was rising.

The real key is that they need to be—and we've talked about this. There's a need for transparency. There's a need for them to build trust between their neighbors, which happen to be our allies. And as they evolve this military capability, what are they going to do with it? Is it there to pursue their own interests at the expense of others in this kind of tightly controlled, tightly—small sea space part of the world? Or is it to be a contributor to a security environment where they global economy and all the peace and prosperity can continue?

So that's what we have to contemplate.

Senator KING. Using the word "transparency" in connection with China strikes me as something of an oxymoron.

I also would like, Mr. Chairman, to associate myself with the comments, particularly at the end, of Senator Graham's remarks about on the one hand we have this commercial relationship with China, on the other hand they have some opportunities to really assist in peace around the world and aren't doing so. I think Senator Graham put it quite well.

To change the subject entirely, General Kelly from the Southern Command when he was here last month talked about non-state actors, transnational criminal organizations, pirates, if you will, smugglers, human smugglers, drugs, weapons. Is that a serious issue in your command and are we equipped to deal with it effectively, particularly given the size of your jurisdiction?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. It is a concern and it's a growing concern. I think that transnational organizations will continue, in the current security environment we're in, will continue to proliferate. We've done some—I think the joint U.S. forces and the United States of America have done some really magnificent work over the last decade or so to help curtail particularly Al-Qaeda activity globally.

But where you have disaffected populations and you have all these things that enter into frustrations of peoples, there's a poten-

tial for that. We don't see a significant today terrorist threat. There's pockets of it that we deal with. We work carefully with our Filipino partners in the Philippines in some operations that we help train and assist in there. Of course, in India there is always the concern about the transition of terrorists basically from the West into India that we discuss and talk about.

But what we're doing mostly in PACOM to try to stay ahead of this is we're working to ensure our information-sharing, so that as these networks develop either internal to countries or transnationally across countries, that we're able to sense and understand with each other what they're doing, how they're doing it, and being able to interdict them before this becomes a larger problem.

Senator KING. I know my time has expired. One very quick question. In the Cold War there was the famous hot line between Moscow and Washington. Is there a similar kind of direct communication link between Washington and Beijing to your knowledge?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. There is, and there's also—if necessary there would be one between me and Beijing as well. And we exercise that on occasion. But as I've said to my Chinese counterparts, we need to get better at this, because I don't have the same relationship I have with maybe the chief of defense of Japan or of Korea or of the Philippines, where we understand each other, we meet routinely, we talk through security issues. We need to move that forward with our relationship with China, because we have many things that are friction points and we also have many, many things that we have in common with each other, and we need to understand those better.

Senator KING. It's nice to have a relationship before the crisis. Thank you, Admiral.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator King.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Admiral, good morning.

Admiral, going back to sequestration, in a big AOR such as yours, to be ready you have to do a lot of exercises. Is there any capability of using our increasingly enhanced ability in simulation to keep your troops ready as a substitute for actual exercises?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Senator, I think you'll find that we have—that we have spent an awful lot of money and time on developing simulations that help us. So I see simulations that help us across all of the joint force today that are critical. Many of what we used to fly in airplanes are now done in simulators and so a huge, huge cost savings there. Our highest end ships today do most of their training via simulators because the cost to actually fire the weapons and very expensive missiles and things are prohibitively expensive. Even at the joint force command level, we do synthetic training where we bring in synthetic exercises to pulse the force and make it work.

Should there be more of this? Absolutely. The down side to it is that it is expensive to get into it. There's a cost to have to get into it. So we have to weigh that, that cost of asking the services to buy it, versus whether or not it can be realized.

Senator NELSON. Let me ask you about, going back to the North Korean nuclear program. Recently they said they were going to re-

open their mothballed Yongbyon reactor, weapons-grade plutonium. They had shut it down, as far as we know, in '07 and people have testified that it would take at least six months to get the reactor up and running.

Do you agree with this kind of assessment? Let me just stop there.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, first, I think it's a bad decision by North Korean leadership to do it. It's in direct contradiction of the UN Security Council resolutions and the agreements that have been made in the past. It's certainly provocative in nature.

The time line that you discuss is what I have seen roughly approximates that. But it's just an approximation at this point in time.

Senator NELSON. Okay, so that's six months. Now, it's another thing taking a nuclear weapon and then integrating it on a delivery system. Presumably they have the ability to integrate it on short-range delivery systems. What about the long range? We've heard testimony from senior officials that they have not produced the ability of mounting nuclear weapons on long-range.

Can you share your thoughts in this open forum or does that need to go into closed for?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I would say that to get into the specifics of it we'd probably need to go into a more closed forum. However, as a general rule I would say that we have not seen them demonstrate that capability yet. Now, they have indicated to us that they have it, which makes us—we're going to take it seriously when someone indicates it, and I think we've done prudent due diligence steps to ensure the defense of the homeland and our allies and our forces forward. But we haven't seen them demonstrate that capability.

Senator NELSON. For the American people to understand our capability with this bellicose nature of this new young leader in North Korea, can you state for the record here that between the United States' ground-to-air, sea-to-air capability of knocking down one of his threatening missiles from North Korea, that we have that capability?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I can confirm we have that capability.

Senator NELSON. Yes, sir, that we do.

Now, what about the F-22s? They were at Kadena going to be sent back to the United States and that was a plan that was in process until all of this bellicosity started by the Korean young leader. So then we sent our F-22s in some kind of exercise with South Korea. Do you think we ought to continue on that long-planned process of sending those F-22's out of Japan back to the United States?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, you know, we rotate—we have two types of forces in my theater, one that are forward-deployed all the time, which is forward naval deployed forces and the air components that are there in both Japan and Korea; and then we have rotational forces. So I use a blend of those to maintain the capacity of the theater to deal with what we have to.

Some of those are perfectly useful being deployed from the States here. So over time we've used force packages, F-22s are one, where we rotate them in and out. It lets them go back and get the high-end training they need and those types of things.

The decisions we made recently, I won't talk about specifically why we made those. But I think it was prudent decisions that we made, on General Thurman's behalf, to maintain stability of the force that we saw in Korea just in case we saw a contingency that we hadn't anticipated.

What I have more concern about is not so much our ability to rotate them, but our ACC's capability to sustain them through sequestration in a readiness status that allows them to get to me in time to be trained and ready.

Senator NELSON. Finally, Admiral, you've got a lot of terrorist activity going on in your AOR and you've had some stunning successes over the years—catching the Bali bomber, the success that we've had in the southern Philippines, Zamboanga. But terrorism continues throughout the AOR, including Mumbai, etcetera.

If you would provide in a classified setting for the committee what you are doing with regard to an attack not only of the terrorism, but all of the other illicit activities that go along with terrorism, such as transfer of drugs, money laundering, and other terrorism-related activities, I would appreciate that for this committee in a classified process.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. All right, sir. I will take that and provide it.

Senator NELSON. And have that, of course, sent to the chairman, but make sure that part of it is directed to me.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. We will ask staff when this is received in a classified form to notify the members of the committee that it's available for members. Thank you for raising that, Senator Nelson.

Senator SHAHEEN.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Locklear, thank you very much for being here and for your stamina in responding to our questions.

I want to—forgive me if I re-cover some ground that you've already responded to. Assuming that we continue to operate on heightened alert with respect to North Korea, is there any indication that sequestration has limited your ability to respond to a crisis there?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. It has not limited my ability to date.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, that's really the question that I have, because you have indicated that sequestration will have an impact over time in the operational capability of PACOM and obviously other parts of our military. So at what point are we going to get to that tipping point where it is going to have an impact on our ability to respond, and how do we know that and how can you convey to members of this committee and to Congress when we've reached that tipping point?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, we're continually looking at our readiness capabilities in the AOR, in my area, particularly of the forward-deployed forces. So I have certain priorities that I maintain as we go through any kind of budget decision process. One is I have to be able to sense what's going on in my area of responsibility. So there's a continuing high demand for intelligence and reconnaissance type of activity so we know what's going on. It gives me the ability to understand what's happening. It gives me the ability to coordinate with our allies. So we do that.

The second thing is I need to make sure that, at least in the near term right now, in fact in the long term too, that the forces on the Korean Peninsula, that they're ready to do what we call a fight tonight, if something happens there that we're able to respond in ability to protect the interests of the alliance and the interests of the United States, as well as the soldiers, sailors, and airmen that are on the peninsula. So keeping those forces attuned and ready to be able to respond is something we're doing and that I've done now.

Then finally, my concern is as those forces need to be replaced over time, are those forces that need to replace them, are they agile, are they trained, are they able to get there? Is there the money to do the training to keep those skill sets up? This is where I think the impacts of sequestration start to make the choices very difficult for the services. The services do have some leeway in where they make their decisions, but not a lot, particularly in the near term.

Now, as you go further down into the planning cycle into the out years, you might be able to start looking at different ways of doing it. But in the near term and the mid-term it's going to have an impact on us.

Senator SHAHEEN. So I missed the part where you said there was a mechanism to notify Congress when you get to that point.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I didn't mean to skip over that part. We keep a very formatted reporting system that's monitored by the joint force. The chairman then takes from me about once a quarter my assessment of the risk that we're assuming in the theater, and that risk then gets supported to the Secretary of Defense. My guess is that through the dialogue at that level that our readiness levels are well reflected.

There's no secret here. We won't hide readiness that we don't have. We're very upfront about it. It's a matter of kind of a—I put it, like a math equation. What you put in is what you get out. When we can't meet those readiness requirements, then that becomes risk and that's risk that I have to manage as a combatant commander. When my risks get too high, where they go from risks to being potentially worse than risk, then my responsibility is to tell my leadership and you that those risks are too high.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, as chair of the Readiness Subcommittee I hope you feel like you have a direct line in to me when you get to that point. I certainly hope that we will have addressed sequestration before we get to that point. I think it's critical to our National security.

Let me follow up on a line of questioning that Senator Kaine was going after relative to the potential for what's happening in North Korea to set off a nuclear arms race across Asia. I understand that India continues to develop nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarines, that Pakistan has indicated an interest in doing that because of India's capability. So how do we combat the risk that, whether it's those nuclear ballistic missile technologies, whether it's the technology that North Korea now has and we know already has shared with other non-state actors in a way that is dangerous, how do we keep that from proliferating?

Can you also talk, if you would, the extent to which the effort to address arms control has an impact on the thinking of actors about this question?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. First let me give you my kind of position from the PACOM commander. First, I support the nuclear triad from where I sit.

Senator SHAHEEN. Right.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I support, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, that we have a safe, reliable, and secure nuclear deterrent. But also the father in me says that I'd like to see a world that didn't have nuclear weapons, because—will we ever realize that? I don't know, but it would be nice some day if the world could see themselves to that. But I'm not predicting that that's going to happen any time soon.

So to the question of the proliferation among what I would call state actors that are building a nuclear deterrent, that's really not something—that's got to be dealt with above my level. But when you talk about like a North Korea that is potentially going to proliferate nuclear technology to irresponsible actors, and particularly maybe to transnational threats or to actors which you could extrapolate that to, this becomes a very real concern for me.

Now, so it gets to the issue of how do you monitor it, how do you interdict it, how does the international community enforce the U.N. Security Council resolutions that forbid all this, so it all fits together, my part of that is on kind of the monitoring and interdiction side of it.

Now, so the question then of how does the nuclear proliferation or a discussion of nuclear weapons in the theater, which I think is what you're kind of getting at, we have an extended deterrence policy for our allies in this part of the world, and it works. There is occasionally discussions about, well, would our actions here in this, what we're doing here, would it create a desire by our allies or other partner nations to want to proliferate their own nuclear systems.

First of all, it would not be beneficial. It's unnecessary. I'm confident that the U.S. extended deterrence policies are adequate and substantial enough to do what's necessary. But deterrence isn't just about nuclear weapons. It's also about conventional capabilities and how those conventional capabilities are applied and how they're viewed.

So this is what makes it important for our forward presence, our exercises that were talked about here, that build that confidence in the alliances that we've had over the years, that make it—in any scenario, you want to handle a contingency through conventional means. I mean, you just don't want to go the other direction. So ensuring that the conventional side of our deterrent is strong deserves equally as much discussion as the other side of it, in my view.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

I just have one additional question. Then I'll call on others to see if they might for a second round just have an additional question or two.

Admiral, I think you've heard from this committee to a person some very strong feelings that China could if it chose put an end to the provocative, blustering kind of comments that are coming from North Korea and thereby help to avoid a miscalculation and a possible spinning out of control of military actions on the peninsula. We all I think have very strong feelings that China creates all kinds of problems for us in terms of what they do in cyber, in what they do in other areas. I mentioned some of those in my opening statement and others have mentioned them very powerfully as well.

But in this interest our interests are the same. It's clear to me that China, at least in their vote at the U.N., is indicating some willingness now to take some action to try to prevent the kind of spinning out of control that could lead to serious military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula.

I asked you whether or not we are ready to respond appropriately and proportionately should North Korea take some action against our ally South Korea or against us, and you indicated that we are ready. You also indicated that there is a hot line between you and your counterpart in China that you could use and that you at least are able to communicate with them should you choose.

I guess my question and my request would be the following: that the mil-to-mil contact sometimes is the best way to show a seriousness of purpose on our part with China, and their military has a major influence, obviously, in their government. Would you explore the possibility, after talking to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the perhaps Secretary of State—the Secretary of Defense could do that—would you explore the possibility as to whether it might be useful for you to contact your equivalent person in the Chinese defense establishment, your counterpart, and express to them, your counterpart, the great desirability of China weighing in with North Korea before this—these incidents grow in seriousness, and make it clear to the Chinese that we and the South Koreans want them to act to put an end to the North Korean provocations, and that we and our South Korean allies are prepared to respond in an appropriate way should North Korea take any action against the South or against us.

Would you explore that possibility of that, whether you should at this point make that mil-to-mil connection with your counterpart in China, with your superiors at the civilian, at the Secretary of Defense level, and also with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? Could you explore that?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Absolutely, Senator, I will explore it. And we'll look at it in the context of the benefit, which I think there are—obviously, I have advocated for this with my counterparts in China. There is benefit to establishing those types of links. In this particular scenario I think because of where we are it will have to be tied in with the other communications that are happening through other forms of our government, which I'm sure there are those that are going on with their Chinese counterparts as well. As you know—

Chairman LEVIN. I agree that all ought to be coordinated and linked. But it could add a very important element if this military-to-military communication occurred with your Chinese counterpart.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. So that's something you could take on?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I will explore it, yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. That's what I mean. Thank you.

Any other question? Senator Shaheen—well, I don't need to call in order. I'll just see if anyone raises their hands at this point. Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. I just had one follow-up to the question about should we need to respond to North Korea. What would China—can you suggest what you think China's reaction might be should the United States respond to an act of aggression by North Korea?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, again I'd be making hypotheticals, but I would again go back to what are their enduring interests there. One is their own border security. I think they would be concerned about refugee flow, uncontrolled refugee flow. There's 25 million people there that will be affected by something like that, and how would that be controlled.

I think they will have a similar concern as we have about weapons of mass destruction, not only particularly fissile material but all other weapons of mass destruction that we know that he has the capability and the capacity to have in the country, and how that would be managed at the time. We're contemplating all that and are thinking through how that would be done with our allies in the South as well.

So I think—how would they respond beyond that and how they would do it, I can't speculate on that. But I think again they would move to secure their national interests, just like we would—will.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

If there's no other questions, then we thank you very much, Admiral. As always, you've been very direct and very helpful, and we greatly appreciate your presence here this morning and all the great work you and those who work with you are doing in PACOM.

Thanks again and we will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the committee adjourned.]